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FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Sharon L. O'Brien*
The Supreme Court's opinions in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n.1 and Employment Division v. Smith2
dealt devastating blows to Indian religious rights and their as-
sumed protection under the First Amendment.3 In terms of his-
torical precedent, the decisions were not surprising. The United
States has a history of overt and covert policies designed to de-
stroy or to impede the practice of Indian religions.4
The Court's ruling in Smith considerably narrowed the "com-
pelling interest test" previously used by courts5 to determine
whether the government illegally infringed on religious rights.
The decision galvanized religious leaders and constitutional
scholars around the country to pass the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act of 1993 (RFRA).6 RFRA, finding that "laws 'neutral'
toward religion may burden religious exercise"7 and that "gov-
ernments should not substantially burden religious exercise
without compelling justification,"8 restores the compelling inter-
est test established in Sherbert v. Verner9 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder."°
While prompted by the Court's failure to protect Indian
religious rights, the passage of RFRA is, nonetheless, not expect-
ed to adequately secure to American Indians the free exercise of
* Chair, Department of Government, University of Notre Dame; BA Millsaps
College; M.A. and Ph.D. University of Oregon.
1. 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see infra text and accompanying notes 127-31.
2. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see infra text and accompanying notes 62-72.
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend I.
4. See infra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
5. According to Justice Brennan a government's compelling interest included
only those actions that posed a substantial threat to the public safety, peace, or
order. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(aX3).
9. 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963) (explaining the compelling interest test).
10. 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). The act specifically
refers to the Court's decision in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
which eliminated the "compelling government interest" test. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb(a)(4). The legislation reinstates the compelling interest rule, but does not
overrule the decision in the Smith case, which still stands as law.
The only exception allowed by the act is if there is a compelling governmental
interest which is the least restrictive means of furthering the government's interest.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b). The Act also provides for judicial remedies against the
government. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c).
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their First Amendment rights." To ensure the protection of In-
dian religious freedoms, the Indian Religious Coalition" has
lobbied for the last four years to obtain passage of legislation de-
signed to fill the gaps in RFRA 3 and to secure the unrealized
promises of the previously enacted 1978 American Indian Reli-
gious Freedom Act (AIRFA).'4
This article argues that the federal government is obligated
by the special status of American Indians and Congress' special
trust relationship with tribes to ensure the preservation of Indi-
an religious rights. Part I provides an overview of the historical
events, cultural conflicts, and legal issues that have merged to
create the current precarious state for Indian religious expres-
sion. The government's historical treatment and cultural under-
standings of Indian religions is briefly examined as well as the
courts' findings in several recent decisions relating to peyote use,
11. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
12. The Coalition, which was founded in 1988 by the Native American Rights
Fund (NARF), the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), and the Associa-
tion on American Indian Affairs (AAIA), is now comprised of more than 63 organiza-
tions. For a listing of the members (as of 1993) of the American Religious Freedom
Coalition for the Amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, see
Effectiveness of Pub. L. No. 95-341, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act:
Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Native American Affairs of the House
Comm. on Natural Resources, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1993).
13. Congress considered three bills in the last session. S. 2269, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994), introduced by U.S. Senator Daniel K Inouye (D-Haw.) on July 1, 1994,
is the most comprehensive of the three. See generally Proposed Amendments to the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act 1993: Oversight Hearings on the Need for
Proposed Amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Before the Unit-
ed States Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [here-
inafter Proposed Amendments]. On August 10, 1994, the Senate Indian Affairs Com-
mittee favorably reported the bill, but offered a substitution: the bill died on the
floor of the house. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Bill Tracking S. 2269,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, BLT 103 file.
Representative William B. Richardson (D-N.M.) introduced two bills in the
House. H.R. 4230, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) introduced on April 14, 1994, amends
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act to provide for the traditional use of
peyote by Indians for religious purposes. On October 7, 1994, the House passed H.R.
4230, American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
344, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994).
Another bill, American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994,
H.R. 4155, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) introduced March 24, 1994, was not passed
in the last Congress. The purpose of the bill is to provide for access to sacred sites
on federal lands. See Proposed Amendments, supra at pt. 1.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978). This law instructed the President to direct all
federal agencies to review their procedures and policies and determine changes need-
ed to preserve Native American religious rights and practices. Agencies, which were
to consult with traditional Indian leaders, were to report their findings to Congress
within 12 months. For legislative history, see H.R. REP. No. 95-1308, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1262.
2
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the religious practices of inmates, the taking of ritual animals,
and sacred site access.
Part II reviews the judicial interpretations and issues that
still inhibit the protection of Indian religious rights, despite the
best intentions of RFRA and the proposed Native American Cul-
tural Protection and Free Exercise of Religion Act of 1994.1'
Part III reviews the Court's application of the trust doctrine and
the government's responsibility to preserve tribal existence and
culture.
I. INDIAN RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
As many authors have written, Indian religions interweave
and integrate all aspects of human and spiritual existence.16
Most Indian languages do not possess a word translatable as
"religion."'7 Rather, the concept of religion permeates one's exis-
tence and is indistinguishable from one's cultural, political, and
economic existence. Western religion, on the other hand, is un-
derstood and referenced to a linear concept of time and to the
celebration of important messiahs, prophets, and sacred events.
The rituals of many Indian religions are required to main-
tain the spiritual and earthly harmony and balance of nature,
the community, and the person. As Deward Walker has ex-
plained, "American Indian culture... entails actually entering
sacredness rather than merely praying to it or propitiating it.""
15. See supra note 13.
16. Indian religions cannot be discussed as a monolithic system of beliefs and
practices. Tribal religions do tend to share some common features as do Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam.
Several books and articles have detailed the United States' treatment of Amer-
ican Indian religious rights. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (Christopher Vecsey ed., 1991); JOSEPH E. BROWN, SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF
THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1982); AKE HULTKRANTZ, THE RELIGIONS OF THE AMERICAN
INDIANS (1979); VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED (1973); Robert S. Michaelsen, Ameri-
can Indian Religious Freedom Litigation: Promise and Perils, 3 J.L. & RELIGION 47
(1985); OMER C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY (1987); John Rhodes, An
American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native Americans 52 MONT. L. REV.
13 (1991); Deward E. Walker, Jr., Protection of American Indian Sacred Geography,
in HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 100 (Christopher Vecsey ed.,
1991).
17. Michaelsen, supra note 16, at 49.
18. Walker, supra note 16, at 104.
Whereas Judeo-Christian religion tends to create its own sacred space and
times arbitrarily by special rituals of sacralization, American Indians at-
tempt to discover "access points" or "portals" to the sacred ....
These access points to the sacred ... are not only points in space,
but also points in time .. dawn ... dusk . . . equinoxes and solstic-
es ... certain ... points may be used rarely but can still be very valuable
1995] 453
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For a society accustomed to primarily attending services on Sun-
days and to worship at any of several locations, it is most diffi-
cult to appreciate a non-Western religion that requires the per-
formance of a ritualistic act at a certain time and in a certain
place.
American society's ignorance of and animosity towards Indi-
an religions is long standing, deep seated, and multilayered.
Hostility to Indian religions has assumed many forms, ranging
from the direct to the indirect. The very premise of Christianity,
which requires a belief in Christ as a source of redemption, in-
herently demands the proselytation of non-Christians. 9 The
saving of heathen souls is a directive of many Christian sects. As
an admittedly Christian nation,0 it is understandable that ef-
forts to christianize the American Indian very early suffused
federal policies.2 From the beginning of the nation's develop-
ment, federal efforts to civilize and christianize Indians were
indistinguishable policies. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
turned to the churches for administrative, personnel, and finan-
cial support in their efforts to acculturate the Indian.2 The poli-
cy to exterminate the buffalo,23 thereby starving the Lakota and
at appropriate times.
Walker, supra note 16, at 104.
19. See, e.g., FORREST G. WOOD, THE ARROGANCE OF FAITH: CHRISTIANITY AND
FAITH IN AMERICA (1990); DAvID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: COLUMBUS
AND THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD (1992); Steven Newcomb, The Evidence of
Christian Nationalism in Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v.
McIntosh, and Plenary Power, 20 REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 303 (1993).
20. See Edwin B. Firmage, Free Exercise of Religion in Nineteenth Century
America: The Mormon Cases, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 281 (1989).
21. FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1984).
22. The government and the religious societies were intertwined in their efforts
to civilize and Christianize the Indians throughout the 19th century. The government
supported missionaries with funds, assigned agencies to religious societies, and pro-
vided land for the building of churches. The question is whether this intermingling
constituted an establishment of religion. FEDERAL AGENCIES TASK FORCE, DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT 3-6 (1979) [herein-
after AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT]. This study was mandated
by § 2 of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), Pub. L. No. 95-341, §
1, 92 Stat. 469 (1978).
In Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), the Court ruled that the use of
federal funds to establish a Catholic Church on the Rosebu~d Indian Reservation did
not violate the Establishment Clause. See FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE CHURCHES AND
THE INDIAN SCHOOLS 1888-1912 (1979).
23. It is estimated that white hunters had killed forty million buffalo within
three decades. In 1889, 20 buffalo were known to still live within the Yellowstone
Park. See FRANK G. ROE, THE NORTH AMERICAN BUFFALO: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE
SPECIES IN ITS WILD STATE 493 (1951); PETER MATTHIESSEN, WILDLIFE IN AMERICA
454 [Vol. 56
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other plains tribes into submission,24 attacked the very cultural
and spiritual psyche of the tribes. In 1892, Commissioner of the
BIA, Thomas Morgan, directed Indian Courts of Federal Offenses
to enforce a series of laws outlawing religious practices, includ-
ing "heathenish" dances, plural marriages, ceremonies by medi-
cine men, intoxicants, and the destruction of property at buri-
als.25 Violators were punishable by imprisonment or denial of
rations.26
By 1934, BIA Commissioner John Collier had ended the
Bureau's overt and repressive policies. However, society's and
the government's failure to understand the tenets, premises and
needs of Indian religious practices caused indirect attacks to
persist.27 Prevention of access to sacred sites for ceremonies and
the collection of herbs and medicines, imprisonment for the ritu-
al killing and possession of animal parts," the use of sacramen-
tal peyote, and the display of sacred objects and human remains
prompted tribal lobbying for passage of AIRFA.29
This joint resolution directed the federal government to
"protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right
of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional reli-
gions of the American Indian." ° After many unsuccessful legal
attempts by Indians to cite the AIRFA for the protection of their
rights,31 few would disagree with Justice O'Connor's description
(1959).
24. In 1840 a state legislative report concluded, "[S]o far as game and hunting
are concerned, the sooner our wild animals are extinct the better, for they serve to
support a few individuals just on the borders of a savage state . .. ." JAMES A.
TOBER, WHO OwNS THE WILDLIFE?: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONSERVATION IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 714 (1981). During congressional discussion of the
Buffalo Protection Bill, congressmen argued that the extermination of the buffalo
promoted the submission of the Indian. 2 CONG. REC. 2105-08 (1874).
25. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 29-30 (1892); see AMERI-
CAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT, supra note 22, at 6; see also Circular
No. 1665 6-7 (April 26, 1921).
26. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 29-30 (1892) at 29; see
AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT, supra note 22, at 6.
27. See, e.g., American Indian Religious Freedom: Hearings on S.J. Res. 102 Be-
fore the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
28. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1069 (Alaska 1979).
29. See Circular No. 2970, signed by Secretary of the Interior Harold C. Ickes
at the request of Commissioner John Collier, and sent to all Indian agencies. Enti-
tled "Indian Religious Freedom and Indian Culture," the circular stated that "no
interference with Indian religious life or ceremonial expression will hereafter be toler-
ated." Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
31. See Sharon O'Brien, A Legal Analysis of the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act, in HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 16
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of the policy as a law with "no teeth."32
A. Religious Rights: Tests and Interpretations
Over the last one hundred years, the Supreme Court has
developed a number of tests and interpretative approaches to
determine when the government is impermissibly prohibiting the
free exercise of one's religion and/or when it is improperly in-
volved in the establishment of religion. When seeking to protect
their religious rights from governmental interference, individuals
must answer a number of questions developed by the courts and
must convince the judiciary to employ those tests and interpreta-
tions that will most benefit their arguments. For example, is the
belief sincerely held? Is the practice in question central to the
plaintiffs practice of his religion? Does the governmental law or
regulation prohibit belief, interfere with religious practice or
actually prevent the practice of the religion? If a governmental
exemption from the law in question is needed, is the exemption a
"proper accommodation" or a violation of the Establishment
Clause? Will the exemption violate the equal protection rights of
non-members?
The Court first considered the proper interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause in Reynolds v. United States, an 1878
case.33 Reynolds, a Mormon arrested for polygamy, argued the
First Amendment protected his right to marry more than one
wife. The Supreme Court ruled that a Mormon's religious direc-
tive to engage in polygamy did not exempt him from adherence
to a criminal statute.' Establishing a test that distinguished
between belief and conduct, the Court reasoned that the First
Amendment protected belief, but not conduct.35 Conduct threat-
ening the civil order could be regulated by the government.3 6
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the
at 27; Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Thus AIRFA requires
federal agencies to consider, but not necessarily to defer to Indian religious values. It
does not prohibit agencies from adopting all land uses that conflict with traditional
Indian religious beliefs or practices.").
32. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455
(1988) (quoting 124 CONG. REG. 21,445 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall)). AIRFA con-
tains no enforcement mechanisms to ensure the protection of Indian religious rights
or penalties for their violation.
33. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
34. Id. at 166-67.
35, Id. at 167.
36. Id. at 164-65; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Davis
v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
[Vol. 56
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Court revised the belief/conduct test. 7 In that case, the Court
ruled that the government could not interfere with the exercise
of religious rights without a compelling interest.3 8 In the 1963
case Sherbert v. Verner,39 the Court instructed that the "compel-
ling interest" test be construed as narrowly as possible. Accord-
ing to Justice Brennan, a government's "compelling interest"
entailed only those actions that posed a substantial threat to the
public safety, peace, or order.' The Court again applied this
reasoning in Wisconsin v. Yoder,4' a case in which the Amish
requested an exemption from Wisconsin's school attendance laws
on the grounds that their religion forbade them to send their
children to school past the eighth grade. The Court acceded, rul-
ing that the state's need for its school attendance policy did not
outweigh the rights of the Amish to be protected in the exercise
of their religious duties.42
The next section of this article briefly reviews the judicial
efforts of Indian people in the last three decades to protect their
religious practices by navigating through the courts' various
First Amendment tests and interpretations. Practices briefly
reviewed include the Native American Church's use of peyote;
the right of Indian inmates to gain access to religious expression,
rites, and spiritual leaders; the right to hunt and use animals in
religious ceremonies; and Indian access to sacred lands.
B. Use of Peyote
Archaeologists estimate that peyote use among Indians is
more than 10,000 years old.' Obtained from the button of the
cactus Lophophora Williamsee, religious practitioners ingest
peyote by chewing, making a tea of the button, or swallowing a
capsule. Peyote, which contains mescaline, induces a hallucino-
genic state. This condition, according to believers, allows the
opening of their minds to God's teachings. Peyote is revered as a
deified messenger. Today, the majority of Indian people who use
peyote are members of the Native American Church. Incorporat-
ed in 1918 in Oklahoma, the Native American Church is estimat-
37. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
38. Id. at 639.
39. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
40. Id. at 403.
41. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
42. Id. at 234.
43. STEWART, supra note 16, at 17.
1995] 457
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ed to have approximately 250,000 members.
Indians have suffered historically from repeated efforts to
prohibit and to eradicate their use of peyote. The Spanish out-
lawed peyote use in 1620. The BIA directed its Indian agents
throughout Oklahoma, formerly the Indian Territory, between
1888 and 1934 to consider peyote an intoxicating liquor and to
"seize and destroy" it. In 1889, the Oklahoma Territory enacted
the first statutory prohibition of peyote, which was subsequently
repealed in 1908. Congress considered, but did not enact, twelve
bills between 1917 and 1933 to ban peyote."
By the 1960s, government officials had acquired a more
sophisticated understanding of the role and function of peyote in
Indian religious services. Although the 1965 Drug Abuse Control
Amendments Act45 and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act of 19704 list peyote as an illegal Schedule
I intoxicant Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) regulations specif-
ically exempt peyote used in Indian religious ceremonies.47
Laws in twenty-two states now permit peyote use.' In at least
three of these states, exemptions resulted from state court rul-
ings that laws prohibiting peyote use violated the religious rights
of American Indians."
44. Indian Religion ; Must Say No, THE ECoNOMIST, Oct. 6, 1990, at 25.
45. Pub. L. No. 89-74, 79 Stat. 226 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321,
331, 333, 334, 360, 372 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
46. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1247 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
812(c) (1988)); see David P. Babner, The Religious Use of Peyote After Smith II, 28
IDAHO L. REV. 65, 80-81 (1991-1992) (discussing the exemptions afforded by the DEA
for Indian religious use of peyote).
47. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1994) ("The listing of peyote as a controlled substance
in Schedule I does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religiots [sic]
ceremonies of the Native American Church, and members of the Native American
Church so using peyote are exempt from registration.")
48. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(D) (Michie Supp. 1989); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-22-317(3) (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3402(B) (1989); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-4116(c)(8) (1992).
For a breakdown of the individual state statutes regarding the use of peyote, see
H.R. REP. NO. 675, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
49. In People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964), the California Supreme Court
dismissed the conviction of two Native American Church members arrested for in-
gesting peyote. In an often cited passage, the court reasoned:
[Tihe right to free religious expression embodies a precious heritage of our
history. In a mass society, which presses at every point toward conformity,
the protection of a self-expression, however unique, of the individual and
the group becomes ever more important. The varying currents of the subcul-
tures that flow into the mainstream of our national life give it depth and
beauty. We preserve a greater value than an ancient tradition when we
protect the rights of the Indians who honestly practiced an old religion in
using peyote ....
8
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Somewhat ironically, the courts have supported and justified
Indian sacramental peyote use most strongly in cases that have
not involved Indians as plaintiffs or defendants. 0 In several
instances, non-Indians have requested that an exemption for
religious drug use either be extended to their drug of choice,
such as marijuana," or to their churches. 2 To not extend a
similar exemption, these groups have argued, violated their free
exercise rights, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Establish-
ment Clause.
In Olsen v. DEA, for example, members of the Ethiopian
Zion Coptic Church argued that the government's refusal to
provide an exemption for marijuana use in their church services
unfairly infringed upon their Equal Protection rights and violat-
ed the Establishment Clause in light of the peyote exemption for
American Indians."3 In response, the court distinguished be-
tween the central role played by peyote in the Native American
Church and the function of marijuana in the Ethiopian Zion
Coptic Church.5' Within the Native American Church, the court
stated, peyote is regarded as a deity; it is an object of worship. 5
The use of peyote outside of church services by any Native Amer-
ican Church member is regarded as sacrilegious." The court
stressed that the Ethiopian Coptic Church allowed for marijuana
use outside the church. 7
Id. at 821-22; see also Whithorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977);
State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (holding First Amendment
protects rights of Indians to use peyote in bona fide pursuit of religious faith), review
denied, 517 P.2d 1275 (Ariz. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974).
50. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214-16 (5th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 599 (D.N.D. 1984) (holding
that despite the importance of peyote to the Native American Church, the state in-
terest overrides defendants' free exercise claim).
51. See United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 512-13 (1st Cir. 1984) (denying
marijuana exemption for Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church); Leary v. United States, 383
F.2d 851, 861 n.11 (5th Cir. 1967). In at least one case, a court has denied a re-
quest by Indians to exempt use of marijuana on religious grounds. United States v.
Carlson, No. 90-10465 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 1992) (unpublished disposition at 958 F.2d
242 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding no religious exemption for marijuana use by Yurok Indi-
an in religious ceremonies).
52. See Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1212; Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir. 1972) (refusing request by Church of
the Awakening that peyote exemption extend to their church); Warner, 595 F. Supp.
at 597.
53. 878 F.2d 1458, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
54. Olsen 878 F.2d at 1464-65.
55. Id. at 1464.
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A second line of challenges has come from peyote users who
are not members of the Native American Church but of other
non-native churches that incorporate the use of peyote. In Peyote
Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, members of the Peyote Way
Church of God argued that the Free Exercise and the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution required a similar exemp-
tion for their church. 8 The Fifth Circuit recognized that the
federal government's political relationship with tribes and its
obligation under the trust relationship to protect Indian culture
and religion ameliorated violations of the First Amendment and
Equal Protection Clause.59 Specifically, the court stated: "We
hold that the federal [Native American Church] exemption allow-
ing tribal Native Americans to continue their centuries-old tradi-
tion of peyote use is rationally related to the legitimate govern-
mental objective of preserving Native American culture."0
Despite these legislative, regulatory, and judicial advances,
Indians were still prohibited in approximately twenty-eight
states from using peyote-laws which the Supreme Court judged
in Employment Division v. Smith6 do not violate the First
Amendment rights of American Indians. In Smith, the Supreme
Court considered a case involving two Indian alcohol drug coun-
selors who were fired from their jobs for testing positive for peyo-
58. 922 F.2d 1210, 1212-13 (5th Cir. 1991).
59. Id. at 1217. The court in Peyote Way stated:
The unique guardian-ward relationship between the federal government and
Native American tribes precludes the degree of separation of church and
state ordinarily required by the First Amendment. The federal government
cannot at once fulfill its constitutional role as protector of tribal Native
Americans and apply conventional separatist understandings of the estab-
lishment clause to that same relationship.
Id. at 1217.
60. Id. at 1216; see also United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 513 (1st Cir.
1984) ('[Rleligion is an integral part of the Indian culture and that the use of...
peyote [is] necessary to the survival of Indian religion and culture.") (quoting Peyote
Way Church of God, Inc. v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632, 637 (N.D. Tex. 1983)); United
States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595 (D.N.D. 1984); Peyote Way Church of God, Inc.
v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632, 639 (N.D. Tex. 1983) ("Congress has the power or duty
to preserve our Native American Indians . ..as a cohesive culture."). But see United
States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991) (ruling that Native American
Church exemption is not restricted solely to non-Indian members); Native American
Church v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that ex-
emption for peyote is equally available to the plaintiff, if in fact, it is a bona fide
religious organization, using peyote for sacramental purposes and regarding it as a
deity); State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950, 952 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (holding Free
Exercise Clause protects use of peyote in connection with a bona fide practice of a
religious belief).
61. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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te use. The two counselors, both recovering alcoholics, were prac-
ticing members of the Native American Church."2 Their use of
peyote and their spiritual beliefs had played a major role in their
own recovery from alcoholism. Arguing they were fired for legiti-
mate cause, the State denied them unemployment benefits. The
men appealed, charging the state with a violation of their First
Amendment rights. 3 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
ruled that state law forbidding the ingestion of peyote did not
violate the counselors' First Amendment Rights.6 Justice Scalia
reasoned that, in essence, states may choose to allow or to pro-
hibit the religious use of peyote by American Indians, depending
upon the state's definition of "public safety." 5
In reaching its decision, the Court declined to use the two-
part compelling interest test that it had previously employed to
determine if a law impermissibly burdened religion.6 In a re-
turn to the belief/conduct interpretation, Justice Scalia stated
that allowing individuals to determine which laws they would
obey according to their personally held religious beliefs would
allow a religious objector "to become a law unto himself."" The
protection of minority religions, according to Justice Scalia, was
a "luxury" that would "court[ ] anarchy." The Court concluded
that if minority religions desired such protection, the most ap-
propriate forum was the political process and the passage of
specialized laws.69
On October 6, 1994, Congress responded to Justice Scalia's
invitation with the passage of AIRFA.70 The law provides that
"the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for
bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the
practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not
be prohibited by the United States or any State."v"
62. Id. at 874.
63. Id., at 874.
64. Id. at 890.
65. Id. at 878-89; see, e.g., State v. Bullard, 148 S.E. 2d. 565, 569 (N.C. 1966);
State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 239, 243 P. 1067, 1073 (1926).
66. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. According to Scalia, the Court had used the
Sherbert test only in instances related to a denial of unemployment compensation.
Id. at 883-85.
67. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
68. Id. at 888.
69. Id. at 890; see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
70. AIRFA, Pub. L. No. 103-344, §§ 1-3, 108 Stat. 3125, 3125 (1994).
71. AIRFA, Pub. L. No. 103-344, § 3(5Xb)(1), 108 Stat. 3125, 3125 (1994). Sec-
tion 3(4) of the law specifically cites the Smith decision and the uncertainty raised
by the case as to the protection of peyote under the compelling interest test. Section
1995]
11
O'Brien: Freedom of Religion in Indian Country
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1995
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
C. Exercise of Prisoners' Religious Rights
Minorities comprise a disproportionate number of inmates in
the federal and state prisons. Indians are no exception. Accord-
ing to the 1980 census, there are as many Indians living in pris-
on cells as live in college dorm rooms.72
Prisoners do not forfeit all their constitutional rights once
incarcerated.73 The right to practice one's religion is clearly re-
tained.74 From a rehabilitative standpoint, an inmate's re-iden-
tification with his or her religious and cultural teachings has
proven beneficial.75 For many Indian prisoners, access to spiri-
tual leaders; the practice of their traditional ceremonies, includ-
ing those associated with the sweat lodge, the pipe and the Na-
tive American Church; the wearing of a medicine bag, or wearing
one's hair long or with a headband are important to Indian spiri-
tual existence. The judiciary has supported Indian prisoners in
their requests to express their religious needs only in those in-
stances in which penological interests relating to security and
health are found to be of less importance. The test employed by
the courts to determine how one's religious needs are weighed
against the prison's interest is obviously critical to the outcome.
The courts have employed two primary tests to determine if
prison regulations legitimately interfere with prisoners' constitu-
tional rights." The older of the two is the "least restrictive
means" test, which requires prison officials to attain their objec-
tives by using the least restrictive procedures or methods.77 The
3(b)(6) provides that any regulations promulgated by federal agencies and states in
the enforcement of their traffic laws must comply with the balancing test set forth in
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
Although the courts have not yet adjudicated Pub. L. No. 103-344, supporters
hope that this law will finally secure to Indians the complete protection of religious
peyote use that the First Amendment and AIRFA failed to provide.
72. See MATTHEW SNIPP, AMERICAN INDIANS: THE FIRST OF THIS LAND 106
(1989).
73. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
74. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (prisoner retains First
Amendment rights not inconsistent with penological objectives); Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
75. Alcohol use is implicated in a significant portion (97%) of crimes for which
Indians are convicted. See RONET BACHMAN, DEATH AND VIOLENCE ON THE RESERVA-
TION 30-32 (1992). One of the most effective methods for reversing alcohol use on
reservations has been the use of religious and cultural teachings.
76. See Comment, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
812, 837-56 (1977) (arguing that courts have employed at least seven different stan-
dards to determine prisoners' free exercise claims).
77. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 359 (8th Cir. 1975).
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more recent test, enunciated in two 1987 Supreme Court cases,
Turner v. Safley" and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,79 provides
that prison regulations may interfere with First Amendment
guarantees if "reasonably related"" to the legitimate interests
of the prison facility."'
Indian inmates, on balance, have successfully argued that
they, like Christian and Muslim prisoners, have a right of access
to their own spiritual leaders and ceremonies.82 How often and
under what conditions this right of access occurs is more
problematic. In Allen v. Toombs," an Indian inmate requested
daily access to a sweat lodge, arguing that his fellow Christian
prisoners were able to attend church daily. The Ninth Circuit
ruled that access to a weekly sweat lodge ceremony provided
inmates with a reasonable ability to exercise their religious
rights.' In 1992, the Seventh Circuit ruled that an Indian
prisoner's attendance at three ceremonies within a four month
time period, provided him with an adequate opportunity to prac-
tice his religious ceremonies." In Indian Inmates v.
Grammer,"6 the court held that not permitting Indian inmates
to use peyote during their Native American Church services was
a "serious interference with their free exercise rights," but that
prisons, nonetheless, have the right to refuse peyote use for
purposes of security, safety, and discipline. 7
78. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
79. 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (upholding prison regulations which prevented Islamic
prisoner from attending Friday services and from wearing a beard).
80. In Turner, the Supreme Court established a four prong test to determine
the validity of a prison regulation in the face of constitutional guarantees: (1) wheth-
er a "valid, rational connection" existed between the regulation and the legitimate
government interest; (2) whether an alternative means was available to allow for the
exercise of the right in question; (3) the manner in which an accommodation would
affect the prison resources and the impact the accommodation would have on prison
guards and other inmates; (4) if an alternative exists to the impeding prison func-
tion. 482 U.S. at 89-91.
81. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349.
82. See, e.g., Indian Inmates v. Gunter, 660 F. Supp. 394 (D. Neb. 1987);
Marshno v. McMannus, Case No. 79-3146 (D. Kan. Nov. 14, 1980); Bear Ribs v.
Taylor, Civ. No.77-3985RJK(G) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 1979).
83. 827 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987).
84. Allen, 827 F.2d at 566-67.
85. Frederick v. Murphy, No. 91-3699, 1994 WL 4851 (7th Cir. Jan. 12, 1993);
see also Gunter, 660 F. Supp. at 398-99 (concluding that Indian prisoners had a right
to visit with medicine men, but not to access sweat lodges).
86. 649 F. Supp. 1374, 1374 (D. Neb. 1986).
87. Gunter, 649 F. Supp. at 1379. H.R. 4230 provides: "This section shall not be
construed as requiring prison authorities to permit, nor shall it be construed to pro-
hibit prison authorities from permitting, access to peyote by Indians while incarcerat-
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Many penological institutions argue that the same objectives
of security, safety, and discipline require inmates to maintain
short hair. For the vast majority of prisoners this mandate repre-
sents little hardship. For many Indian people, however, the
wearing of long hair is of deep religious importance, signifying
oneness with the Great Spirit. Braids symbolize the integration
of one's mind, body, and spirit. In two earlier cases, Teterud v.
Burns and Gallahan v. Hollyfield,89 the courts held that the
two prisons in question had violated the Indian inmates' First
Amendment right by requiring the wearing of short hair."
The courts' current interpretation has severely compromised
Indian rights in this regard. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,"
the Court ruled that penological requirements for short hair
outweighed a Moslem prisoner's religious requirement to main-
tain long hair. Two subsequent appellate decisions applied the
Court's ruling to Indian inmates. In Hall v. Bellmon92 and
Holmes v. Schneider,93 the courts held that the prisons' right to
force the cutting of hair for reasons of safety overrode the Indian
inmates' constitutional claims to First Amendment protection. 4
Prisoners' requests to wear headbands-the symbol of the
sacred circle-have received an equally mixed reception. In a
district court decision, Reinert v. Haas, the court analogized the
headband's symbol to the sacred circle with the sign of the Chris-
tian cross and found that Indian inmates possessed a constitu-
tionally protected right to wear their headbands." More recent-
ed within Federal or State prison facilities." H.R. 4230, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. § 3b(5)
(1994).
88. 522 F.2d 357, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1975); see also Alabama & Coushatta Tribes
v. Big Sandy Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1329 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (finding the deci-
sion in Teterud to be persuasive in ordering an injunction against school regulations
requiring Indian children to cut their hair, despite the Supreme Court's ruling in
Smith).
89. 670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1982).
90. Gallahan, 670 F.2d at 1346-47.
91. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
92. 935 F.2d 1106, 1114 (10th Cir. 1991).
93. No. 92-1451, 1992 WL 323469 (8th Cir. Nov. 6, 1992).
94. In Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
897 (1988), reh'g denied, 488 U.S. 987 (1988), the Sixth Circuit (applying the Turner
factors, supra note 81) ruled that, "[a]ifter balancing the defendant's interest in keep-
ing prisoners' hair short against the right of the plaintiff to exercise the religion of
the Lakota Indians, we hold that the regulation restricting hair length, as applied to
the plaintiff, is not unconstitutional." Pollock, 845 F.2d at 659-60; see also Iron Eyes
v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 1990); Cole v. Flick, 758 F.2d 124 (3rd Cir.
1985) (denying prisoner's right to wear long hair for religious purposes protected by
First Amendment).
95. 585 F. Supp. 477, 481 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
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ly, however, the Ninth Circuit in Standing Deer v. Carlson,96
ruled that prison regulations against wearing headgear were
"logically connected" to prison objectives to maintain security.97
It is too early to determine if RFRA will adequately assist
Indian prisoners in the protection of their First Amendment
rights.98 In several opinions courts have ruled that RFRA has
provided a new standard of judicial review. By reinstating the
"compelling interest" test, justices are now to consider "the least
restrictive means" of furthering prison objectives rather than
considering whether prison restrictions serve a "legitimate
penological interest."99
D. Use of Animals for Ceremonial Purposes
Animals play a central role in many Indian religious ceremo-
nies. Fishing tribes of the Pacific Northwest celebrate salmon.
Alaskan natives consider the bear, moose, and elk to be of ritual-
istic importance. Whales are central to the spiritual integrity of
Inuit groups. Many Indian peoples believe the eagle is preemi-
nent, symbolizing a spiritual connection with the Great Creator.
The necessity to incorporate certain animals into Indian rituals
directly conflicts with state and federal laws protecting wild-
life."° The 1918 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 0 ' the 1940 Bald
Eagle Protection Act,0 2 and the 1973 Endangered Species
96. 831 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1987).
97. Standing Deer, 831 F.2d at 1528.
98. As of fall 1994, courts had not heard any cases involving Indian inmates
and alleged violations of RFRA.
99. See generally Abbott Cooper, Dam the RFRA at the Prison Gate: The Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act's Import on Correctional Litigation, 56 MONT. L. REV.
325 (1995); see also Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REv. 171, 203-05 (1995). See, e.g.,
Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 69 (8th Cir. 1994); Messina v. Mazzeo, 854 F. Supp.
116 (E.D. N.Y. 1994).
100. However, various exemptions do appear in specific treaties, typically allow-
ing for subsistence takings by Eskimos and Indians. For example, the 1916 Canadian
Convention excepts the taking of birds by Eskimos and Indians for food and clothing.
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, United States-Great
Britain (on behalf of Canada), 39 Stat. 1702, 1703, T.S. No. 628. Eagles first received
federal protection pursuant to the 1936 convention between the United States and
Mexico. See Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals,
Feb. 7, 1936, United States-Mexico, 50 Stat. 1311, T.S. No. 912 (providing for later
inclusion of migratory birds at the request of the Presidents of both nations).
101. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-15 (1988).
102. See Tina S. Boradiansky, Comment, Conflicting Values: The Religious Killing
of Federally Protected Wildlife, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 709 (1990), for a discussion of
how these acts have impacted on the religious taking of animals. The author argues
15
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Act103 prohibit Indians from taking protected animals from
their own lands. To counter these federally imposed prohibitions
and state game laws, tribes have argued that these laws violate
protected hunting and fishing rights °4 and violate their First
Amendment rights. 5
Again the courts' understanding of and rulings concerning
ceremonial animal use has been inconsistent. In United States v.
Billie,"° the court refused to find the defendant, the tribal
chairman of the Seminole Tribe, exempt from violating the En-
dangered Species Act on the basis of his First Amendment
rights. Employing the centrality test, 0 7 the court ruled that the
panther was not indispensable to the practice of the Seminole
religion. Moreover, the court asserted, the panther's importance
to Billie's spiritual life was outweighed by the government's
interest in protecting wildlife.
However, in United States v. Abeyta,'0° the court ruled that
the First Amendment protected the Pueblos' taking of golden
eagles on their own lands. As the symbol of the overseer of life,
the eagle holds an exalted position in Pueblo religious life. The
government's use of a permit system to dispense eagle parts for
religious purposes was found to be an impermissible burden on
Indian religious practices."°
Not surprisingly, tribes have proven most successful in pro-
that Indian religious rights should not be interpreted as more protected than the
rights of endangered species.
103. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
104. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); United States v. Fryberg, 622
F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980); United States v. Allard,
397 F. Supp. 429 (D. Mont. 1975).
105. See United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301
(D. N.M. 1986); United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. 269 (D.
Nev. 1986).
106. 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1497 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
107. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1497.
108. 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D. N.M. 1986).
109. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. at 1307. The permit system was also challenged in
Top Sky, 547 F.2d at 483 (ruling that the defendant did not have standing to assert
infringement on Indian Religious practices and free exercise and that commercial
purposes were outside scope of religious practices). See also Golden Eagles, 649 F.
Supp 269 (recognizing permit system as a burden, but holding wildlife protection an
appropriate governmental interest).
In recognition of this impediment, President Clinton established new policies
for use of eagle feathers by Indian religious leaders. See Memorandum for the Heads
of Executive Departments and Agencies, Policy Concerning Distribution of Eagle
Feathers for Native American Religious Purposes from William J. Clinton, April 29,
1994.
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tecting their rights before courts when they have successfully
translated for the courts their practices into Christian analo-
gies.11° In Frank v. Alaska,"' the Alaska Supreme Court up-
held the First Amendment rights of an Alaskan native by ex-
empting him from criminal charges for killing a moose out of
season. The use of moose meat in a funeral ceremony, the court
concluded, was of equal symbolism to the "wine and wafer in
Christianity."
1 1 2
E. Access to and Protection of Religious Sites113
Given the courts' application of First Amendment tests and
interpretations, Indians have found it virtually impossible to
obtain protection of and access to their sacred sites."' In
110. See Reinert v. Haas, 585 F. Supp. 477, 481 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (contrasting
the penitentiary's prohibition of Native Americans wearing headbands with permitting
Christians to wear crosses and medals).
111. 604 P.2d 1068, 1072 (Alaska 1979).
112. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1072. The court further ruled that exempting Indians
from state game law was a justifiable accommodation of religious practice that did
not violate the Establishment Clause. Rather, such an approach reflected the
government's "obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences." Id. at 1075
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972)); see also Golden Eagles, 649
F. Supp. at 276 ("As the claimant's affidavits demonstrate, experts in comparative
religion have likened the status of the eagle feather in Indian religion to that of the
cross in the Christian faith.').
It is ironic at the minimum, and unfair, at the maximum, that the courts are
most understanding of Indian religious rights when they are able to translate Indian
religious practices or to favor Christianity as the preeminent religion-in contraven-
tion to the Establishment Clause.
113. A number of legal scholars have detailed the problems which arise for
tribes in their efforts to protect their sacred lands. See, e.g., Robert C. Ward, The
Spirits Will Leave: Preventing the Desecration and Destruction of Native American
Sacred Sites on Federal Land, 19 EcOLOGY L. Q. 795 (1992).
114. See, e.g., Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 977 (1983); Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449
U.S. 953 (1980); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 954 (1981).
In 1970, in one of the few instances in which the government has returned
land to a tribe, President Richard Nixon executed the return of Blue Lake to the
Taos, an area of deep cultural significance. FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER
1127 (1984); see Jack F. Trope, Protecting Native American Religious Freedom: The
Legal, Historical, and Constitutional Basis for the Proposed Native American Free
Exercise of Religion Act, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 373 (1993) (reporting
that an administrative law judge ruled against the development of a proposed hydro-
electric plant); In re Northern Lights, Inc., 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
9 61,352 at 107-08 (1987).
In 1992 the Blackfeet of Montana filed a suit to restore their rights to hunt,
fish, log, graze livestock, and operate commercial ventures in Glacier National Park
under the terms of their 1895 treaty. More than 120 tribes border federal parks.
17
O'Brien: Freedom of Religion in Indian Country
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1995
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,"' the Cherokees filed
suit for an injunction against the flooding of lands by the Tellico
dam. Flooding would prevent access to their sacred birthplace,
Chota-an area important for the collection of medicinal
herbs-and to their ancestral burial grounds."6 Dismissing the
centrality of the Cherokees' religious beliefs, the court ruled that
the tribal members were expressing "a personal preference;"
their concerns were not with religious beliefs, but with the "his-
torical beginnings of the Cherokees and their cultural develop-
ment."
117
That same year, the Tenth Circuit refused a request by
Navajo religious leaders that Rainbow Bridge National Monu-
ment be closed periodically to tourists and that alcoholic bever-
ages not be sold at the monument."' The court acknowledged
that the Navajos regarded Rainbow Bridge as the incarnation of
a deity and that it was therefore of central importance to Navajo
religion." But, in a return to the Reynolds test, the court con-
cluded that although the Park Service's regulations hindered the
Navajo's religious exercise, the regulations did not compel the
Navajos to violate the tenets of their religion. 20 Moreover, the
government's need for low-cost electricity and to promote tourism
outweighed the Navajo's right to freedom of expression.'2 ' Fi-
nally, the government's closure of the monument to tour-
ism-even periodically-would constitute impermissible support
of a religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.'22
The Navajos, joined by the Hopis, were equally unsuccessful
in preventing the Forest Service's and the Department of
Agriculture's expansion of a ski area in the San Francisco
Todd Wilkinson, Ancestral Lands: Native Americans Seek to Restore Treaty Rights to
Worship and Hunt in Many National Parks, 67 NATIONAL PARKS 30 (July 1993). In
the Rocky Mountain region alone, more than 50 Indian nations possess a historic or
spiritual interest in 41 park units. Id. at 35. Recent improvements in negotiations
and communications have also been undertaken in very recent years between the
Park Service and the tribes. Id.; see also Patrick Dawson, Indian Religion a Matter
of Land, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 7, 1993, at 8; Jessica Maxwell, Curly Bear's Prayer;
One Blackfeet Indian's Effort to Stop Gold Mining in the Sweet Grass Hills Area of
Montana, 95 AUDUBON 114 (Mar. 1993) (discussing the BLM's proposed expansion of
a gold mine on the edge of the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana).
115. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
116. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160.
117. Id. at 1164.
118. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
119. Id. at 176.
120. Id. at 178.
121. Id. at 176-78.
122. Id. at 179.
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Peaks.123 The court concluded that while the religious leaders
had demonstrated the importance of the peaks to their religion,
they had not proven their "indispensability."'24 Accordingly, the
proposed development only "offended," but did not "penalize"
members for their religious practices.'25
The Lakota and Tsistsistas (Cheyenne) confronted similar
reasoning in Crow v. Gullet2" where religious leaders attempt-
ed to halt the expansion of tourist facilities at Bear Butte. State
projects and regulations had seriously compromised tribal
members' ability to worship at this sacred location. Again, the
courts recognized that Bear Butte was one of, if not the most
sacred of the ceremonial sites in the Black Hills.'27 However,
interference with the tribal members' ability to practice their
religion did not force them to relinquish their religious beliefs or
to totally abandon their religious practices. Furthermore, the
lower court warned that if the government acceded to the spiri-
tual leaders' requests, its actions could be construed as overly
accommodating and possibly in violation of the Establishment
Clause.1
The Court echoed this analysis in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n." 2 Members of the Yurok, Karok, and
Tolowa tribes sought to prevent the Forest Service from con-
structing a five-mile logging road through their sacred lands.3 0
The Court again declined to apply the strict scrutiny test that
required careful assessment if religious rights were even indi-
rectly coerced or penalized. 3' Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, agreed that "the Indian respondents' beliefs are sincere
and that the Government's proposed actions will have severe
adverse effects on the practice of their religion.""2  The
123. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
956 (1983), and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1056 (1983).
124. Id. at 744.
125. Id. at 745.
126. 541 F. Supp. 785, 794 (D.S.D. 1982), affld, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). In Badoni, the court ruled that to exclude tourists
from the Navajo's sacred area as requested "would seem a clear violation of the
Establishment Clause." 638 F.2d 172 at 179. The Fifth Circuit has used Smith to
find that "the federal and Texas statutes prohibiting peyote possession do not offend
the First Amendment's free exercise clause." Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v.
Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1213 (5th Cir. 1991).
127. Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 788.
128. Id. at 794.
129. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
130. Lyng, 486 U.S. at 442.
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government's proposed actions, nonetheless, would not prohibit
the tribes from exercising their religious beliefs."= Further-
more, the Court ruled that the hands of the federal government
could not be tied in the conduct of its own business on its own
land."'
II. RFRA, AIRFRA, AND THE FUTURE OF INDIAN RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS
From the perspective of Indian religious practitioners, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that the courts have subjected
Indian religious rights to a more rigorous standard of review
than other religious groups."' In several non-Indian decisions,
courts have stated that they were not competent, nor would they
question or judge the accuracy of a religious belief.3 However,
in the Seqoyah and Badoni cases, the courts engaged in exactly
that speculation. 7 Even if Indian plaintiffs pass the sincerity
and centrality tests, they have found it difficult to win the com-
pelling-interest test and convince the courts that their right to
practice their religion outweighs the government's overriding
need to pursue its own interest." In many instances, when
133. Contrast the Court's decision in this case with the laws of Israel and
Saudia Arabia protecting sacred places. Israel's Law states:
1. The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other
violation from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the mem-
bers of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings
with regard to those places.
2.(a) Whosoever desecrates or otherwise violates a Holy Place shall be
liable to imprisonment for a term of seven years. (b) Whosoever does any-
thing likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different
religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those
places shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of five years.
Israel's Protection of Holy Places Law of 5727 (Sefer ha-Chukim, 1967).
134. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453. See Ward, supra note 113 for a discussion of those
federal uses most endangering access and protection of Indian sacred sites and the
range of current federal laws designed to protect some aspect of land use. As Ward
concludes, none of these federal laws, e.g., the Antiquities Act of 1906 or the Nation-
al Historic Preservation Act of 1966, are adequate to the protection of sacred lands.
Ward, supra note 113, at 820.
135. As many commentators have pointed out, the Court's standards are
ethnocentrically based. See Timothy L. Fort, The Free Exercise Rights of Native Amer-
icans and the Prospects for a Conservative Jurisprudence Protecting the Rights of
Minorities, 23 N. M. L. REV. 187, 204 (1993).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
137. See Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980); Badoni v.
Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 178 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Inupiat Community v. United
States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 188 (D. Alaska 1982).
138. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).
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tribes had hoped to prove the validity of their claims using a
compelling-interest test, courts have declined to apply the test
and have instead retrenched to the stricter belief-conduct inter-
pretation. The re-use of this test has allowed the government to
conclude that as long as the government is not telling Indians
how to believe or preventing them from believing, the govern-
ment may restrict and even destroy their ability to practice their
religion.139 Finally, when Indian religious leaders have hoped to
obtain a permissible exemption or accommodation from the gov-
ernment as the Court has extended to other religious groups,
Indians have been told that such an exemption would be an
impermissible violation of the Establishment Clause."4 °
RFRA directs the courts to return to the pre-Smith position
and to employ the compelling interest test when evaluating gov-
ernment infringement on religious rights. The legislation, al-
though supported by tribes, does not offer Indian people ade-
quate protection in the preservation of their religious practices.
The reasons for this concern are substantial. The constitutional-
ity of RFRA may be challenged."' Does Congress have the au-
thority to dictate to the judiciary which tests or which preferred
interpretations the courts should use?"" Will RFRA pass the
Court's analysis of the Acts Establishment Clause implications?"
139. Id. at 451-52.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 114-18; see also Rodney K. Smith, Sover-
eignty and the Sacred: The Establishment Clause in Indian Country, 56 MONT. L.
REV. 295 (1995). See generally Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
141. See, e.g., Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The
constitutionality of this legislation-surely not before us here-raises a number of
questions involving the extent of Congress's [sic] powers under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
142. Congress ostensibly has the authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to pass RFRA. Section 5 provides Congress with the authority "to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 5.
According to Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879), Congress possesses the
authority to pass legislation to enforce constitutional amendments as long as that
authority is not prohibited. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27
(1966).
143. Establishment Clause cases have proven the most troublesome for the Court
in the last thirty years. See Fort, supra note 132, at 188 & n.3.
The Court currently employs a three-prong test to determine if a government
action violates the Establishment Clause: the action must neither advance nor inhibit
religion, have a primarily secular effect, and not excessively entangle the government
with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). "Excessive entangle-
ment" is concluded by determining: the nature and character of the religion benefit-
ting from the governmental action, the nature of the governmental assistance, and
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Even if the constitutionality of RFRA is secure, it is unlikely
that RFRA's provisions are sufficiently broad to cover all instanc-
es pertaining to important Indian religious practices.'" The
Justice Department, for example, has already indicated that it
does not consider RFRA to protect access to sacred sites.'"
Recognizing the possible shortcomings of RFRA and the
obvious failures of AIRFA, congressional supporters of Indian
religious rights have introduced a number of bills designed to
protect Indians' First Amendment rights." The most compre-
the characterization of the resulting relationship between the government and the
religion. Id. at 615.
The Court has accommodated religious practices without finding an interfer-
ence with the Establishment Clause in several instances. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing exemptions from state school attendance laws); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (allowing state property tax exemption for churches);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (allowing state unemployment benefits for
Seventh Day Adventist who was fired for her inability to work on Saturday, her Sab-
bath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(allowing unemployment benefits to Jehovah's Witness who quit job on religious
grounds); Michael W. McConnell, Accomnwdation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4
n.8 (citing other examples). But see Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116
(1982) (overturning a zoning law which allowed churches to prevent issuance of li-
quor licenses to establishments within 500 feet of church property).
Several authors have argued that the protection of Indian religious sites and
practices would not excessively entangle the United States government with Indian
religions. See, e.g., Michaelsen, supra note 16; Ward, supra note 114.
In Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.
1991), the court addressed the establishment issue:
The unique guardian-ward relationship between the federal govern-
ment and Native American tribes precludes the degree of separation of
church and state ordinarily required by the First Amendment. The federal
government cannot at once fulfill its constitutional role as protector of tribal
Native Americans and apply conventional separatist understandings of the
establishment clause to that same relationship.
. . . Thus, we hold that the federal NAC exemption represents the
government's protection of the culture of quasi-sovereign Native American
tribes and as such, does not represent an establishment of religion in con-
travention of the First Amendment.
Id. at 1217.
144. For a detailed examination of those areas in which RFRA is unlikely to
protect Indian concerns, see Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 424-
43 (1992); see also Trope, infra note 114 (summarizing the concerns expressed in the
hearings).
The proposed Senate Bill 2269, in an acknowledgement that RFRA is not pre-
sumed to cover all religious practices, states in Title VI, § 601 (b) that the act is
considered as a supplement to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.
145. See Statement by Philip P. Frickey, Hearings, Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs, Mar. 8, 1993, pp. 13-14; 105-13.
146. President Clinton stated at his meeting with tribal leaders in April:
Last year, I was pleased to sign a law that restored certain constitutional
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hensive is Senate Bill 2269, which is intended to supplement
RFRA and is designed to overcome the Court's decisions in Lyng
and Smith.147 In general, the proposed legislation provides for a
scheme by which sacred sites are to be identified and protected;
an exemption for the religious use, possession, or transportation
of peyote by American Indians at the federal and state levels;
Indian inmates to have access to spiritual leaders, sacred objects
and religious facilities, and to have the right to wear their hair
long (the use of peyote by prisoners is neither exempted or pro-
moted); and the prompt disbursement of bald and golden eagles
and simplification of the permit process for the taking of bald
and golden eagles. In addition, the legislation provides for the
levying of penalties and fines for violation of the Act's provi-
sions."4
Passage of this Act and the one proposed in the House to
protect religious sites remains uncertain. Like RFRA, the bills'
constitutionality may be challenged or the bills may be interpret-
ed so weakly as to offer Indians little protection. 49 If passed,
the bills face uncertain adjudication before the courts."' The
Court's support of any religious rights-but especially those of
Indians-is speculative. Religious freedom cases by definition are
complex cases to resolve. This is understandable given the
changing nature of American society, the innate tension between
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and the First
protection for those who want to express their faith in this country.
No agenda for religious freedom will be complete until traditional
Native American religious practices have received all the protection they
deserve. Legislation is needed to protect Native American religious practices
threatened by [flederal action. The Native American free exercise of religion
act is long overdue. And I will continue to work closely with you and Mem-
bers of Congress to make sure the law is constitutional and strong. I want
it passed so that I can invite you back here and sign it into law in your
presence.
Remarks to American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Leaders, in 30 Wkly Compi-
lations Pres. Doc. 941, 942, 944 (April 29, 1994).
147. S. 2269, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
148. S. 2269, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
149. This is the fate of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. See supra
note 14.
150. Walker, supra note 16 (arguing that the "centrality" test be replaced by an
"integrity" test); Martin C. Loesch, The First Americans and the "Free" Exercise of
Religion, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 313, (1993) (arguing that the test of "indirect" harm
be dropped); John Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Na-
tive Americans 52 MONT. L. REv. 13 (1991) (arguing for the adoption of a "substan-
tial threat" test); Comment, The Trust Doctrine: A Source of Protection for Native
American Sacred Sites, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 705 (1989) (arguing that the
government's trust obligation to protect Indian lands should extend to sacred sites).
1995] 473
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Amendment's importance within constitutional law.
The inherent difficulties of religion cases when combined
with American society's ignorance of native religious practices
severely handicap Indian people in the preservation of their
religious identities. Indian people, by having to struggle against
a pervasive lack of knowledge and against a sense of superiority
that has generated years of persecution, are inextricably placed
at a disadvantage.'51 Perhaps no other field of American law is
so replete with examples of judicial activism and redefinition as
that which concerns the general rights and status of Indians.
And, as described above, tribes are particularly perplexed about
the rationale for the courts' use of interpretative tests in deciding
their religious rights.5 2
It is for these reasons that tribes cannot rely solely on legis-
lation such as AIRFA or RFRA and their legal interpretations to
adequately protect tribal religious rights. In addition to their
efforts to pass protective legislation and adjudication, tribes
must continue to push for expanded recognition and interpreta-
tion of their special status as inherent sovereigns that maintain
a trust relationship with the federal government. Courts' ac-
knowledgement of the government's obligation to protect Indian
existence under the trust relationship should provide the courts
with the necessary "hybrid" situation described by Scalia in the
Smith case or the necessary "weight" needed to tip the balance
for the protection of Indian First Amendment Rights under a
restored compelling interest test.
III. THE TRUST DOCTRINE AS A COROLLARY TO FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION
The federal government, by virtue of the unique political
status possessed by tribes, may extend special treatment to Indi-
an people. Indeed, the extension of positive rights and special
treatment may be necessary (or even required), as in the case of
religious exemptions, to preserve Indian existence.
Tribes, as inherent sovereigns, lie outside the constitutional
151. See Firmage, supra note 20, at 282 (explaining how Christianity in the last
century suffused the Court's writings). For examples of such writings see Vidal v.
Girard's Ex'r, 43 U.S. 127 (2 How. 1844) and Holy Trinity Church v. United States,
143 U.S. 457 (1892).
152. For an updated description of the problems confronted by Indian people, see
the hearings held by the House and Senate since passage of AIRFA. Oversight Hear-
ing on the Need for Amendments to the Indian Religions Freedom Act Before the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. (1992).
474 [Vol. 56
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standards imposed by the Bill of Rights upon other groups and
individuals in American society. Unlike the states, tribal govern-
ments are not pro-forma bound by the United States
Constitution's Bill of Right guarantees when regulating actions
of their members.15 Tribal status and the special political rela-
tionship that Congress maintains with Indian people, taken
together, allow for a separate standard of individual treatment
in seeming contradiction to the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court most squarely recognized this principle
in the 1896 Talton v. Mayes'TM case, which considered the
applicability of the Fifth Amendment to the Cherokee Nation.
The previous year, the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court had
sentenced Bob Talton, an enrolled member of the Cherokee Na-
tion, to death for murder. Talton appealed his conviction to the
United States Supreme Court alleging that the Cherokees had
violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the
United States Constitution by empaneling a Cherokee grand jury
of five members. In finding that the Cherokees were not bound
by the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, the Court ruled
that "the powers of local self government enjoyed by the Chero-
kee nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not oper-
ated upon by the Fifth Amendment."'55
153. This does not mean that tribal individuals do not possess individual
protections against their tribal governments. Most tribal governments have adopted
within their tribal constitutions their own set of individual guarantees. And, in 1968
Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, which applied
many rights found in the federal Bill of Rights to tribal governments. The fact re-
mains, however, that tribal sovereignty is inherent and does not receive its political
authority from the United States Constitution.
154. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
155. Talton, 163 U.S. at 384. The Court also stated:
[Whether the Fifth Amendment applies to the Cherokee nation] depends
upon whether the powers of local government exercised by the Cherokee na-
tion are Federal powers created by and springing from the Constitution of
the United States, and hence controlled by the Fifth Amendment to that
Constitution, or whether they are local powers not created by the Constitu-
tion, although subject to its general provisions and the paramount authority
of Congress.
Id. at 382-83.
In Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602 (Mich. 1889), the state court
ruled that Indian marriages involving polygamy did not violate state or federal law:
While most civilized nations in our day very wisely discard polygamy, and
it is not probably lawful anywhere among English speaking na-
tions . . . .We must either hold that there can be no valid Indian marriage,
or we must hold that all marriages are valid which by Indian usage are so
regarded .... They did not occupy their territory by our grace and permis-
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In 1959, the Tenth Circuit applied the same logic to the
applicability of the First Amendment to the actions of the Navajo
government. In deciding that the Free Exercise Clause did not
prevent the Navajo tribal government from barring the sale, use,
or possession of peyote on the reservation, the court stated:
[Indian tribes] have a status higher than that of states. They
are subordinate and dependent nations possessed of all powers
as such only to the extent that they have expressly been re-
quired to surrender them .... No provision in the Constitution
makes the First Amendment applicable to Indian nations nor is
there any law of Congress doing so."
Tribal exemptions from the usual standards of constitutional
application are most readily apparent in the number of cases
involving Indian exemptions from the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause. In 1978, the Supreme Court issued two
decisions concerning the applicability of the Equal Protection
Clause to the rights of Indian individuals and the rights of tribal
governments. In Morton v. Mancari,'15 7 two non-Indian BIA em-
ployees sued the federal government for violation of the Fifth
Amendment.15 They charged that the BIA's Indian preference
requirement constituted improper racial discrimination and vio-
lated their right to equal treatment.159 The Indian preference
laws, which had operated since 1934, mandated that Indian
individuals be given preferential hiring and promotion with the
BIA.' ° The Court ruled that such a provision was not violative
of the Due Process Clause.16" ' Preferential hiring of American
sion, but by a right beyond our control. They were placed by the
[C]onstitution of the United States beyond our jurisdiction, and we had no
more right to control their domestic usages than those of Turkey or India.
Id. at 605.
The Kobogum decision is particularly interesting given the importance to the
discussion of religious protection of the Supreme Court's ruling in Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Michigan court declined to apply the rationale in
Reynolds holding in Kobogum. See id. at 605-06.
156. Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35 (10th
Cir. 1959); see also Mission Indians v. American Mgt. & Amusement, Inc., 840 F.2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1987); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959); Seneca Constitutional Rights Org. v. George, 348 F.
Supp. 51 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Mont.
1963).
157. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
158. Id. at 539.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 537-38.
161. Id. at 555.
[Vol. 56
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Indians was not a racial arrangement but a political arrange-
ment that was tied rationally to the government's fulfillment of
its special political relationship with tribes.16
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez," Maria Martinez chal-
lenged the validity of the Santa Clara Pueblo's enrollment re-
quirements."' Children born to Santa Clara Pueblo women
who married outside the tribe were ineligible for membership;
yet, the ordinance extended membership to children of male
members who married outside the tribe." Mrs. Martinez, on
behalf of herself and her children, argued that the tribal laws
constituted impermissible sex and ancestry discrimination in
violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.1"
The Court ruled, "[T]ribes remain quasi-sovereign nations
which, by government structure, culture, and source of sover-
eignty are in many ways foreign to the constitutional institutions
of the Federal and State Governments."67 Therefore the Court
held that the United States was obligated to protect Indian sta-
tus and culture and denied Mrs. Martinez's claim.'6
As discussed previously, challenges to special treatment for
American Indians have arisen in a number of cases dealing with
federal and state exemptions for sacramental peyote use by
American Indians. 169 Courts have supported differential treat-
162. Morton, 417 U.S. at 553-55. The Court based its decision on: (1) the histori-
cally unique guardian-ward trust relationship of the federal government with quasi-
sovereign Native American tribes; (2) Congress' plenary authority under Article 1 "'to
regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes;" (3) the federal government's treaty
power in Article II, § 2; and (4) precedent in which the Court had upheld preferen-
tial treatment of Indians. Id. at 551-55.
163. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
164. Id. at 51.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 71. "As [the Supreme Court has] repeatedly emphasized, Congress'
authority over Indian matters is extraordinarily broad . . . ." Id. at 72; see United
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (finding an equal protection violation by
prosecuting Indians under stricter federal law rather than less-strict state law); see
also Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 926 (1976);
Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979)
(upholding New Mexico's right to pass legislation allowing for Indian commercial
sales to the exclusion of other artists in defined locations); White v. Califano, 437 F.
Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977) ("[A]n equal protection analysis cannot be reached in this
case because federal law requires that Florence Red Dog be treated differently than
other South Dakota citizens precisely because she is an Indian person residing in
Indian country."). For a discussion of the Equal Protection Clause as it relates to
American Indians, see Ralph W. Johnson & Susan E. Crystal, Indians and Equal
Protection, 54 WASH. L. REV. 587 (1979).
168. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71-72.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 46-60.
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ment for Indian peyote use when challenged by non-Indians. In
Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh,7 ' the Fifth Circuit
held that federal and state exemptions for the use of peyote by
Native American Church members did not violate the petitioners'
free exercise rights, equal protection rights, or the Establishment
Clause.'
If, as courts have concluded, Indians are not necessarily
judged by the same standards of constitutional interpretation as
non-Indians, an important question remains: By what standards
are Indians' rights to be judged? The answer to this question is
found partly in the answer to why Indians are not judged by the
same constitutional standards. Indians are accorded a different
standard of protection and review because of their special status
and relationship to the federal government. This relationship,
referred to as the trust relationship, obligates the federal govern-
ment to protect tribal existence for as long as the tribes request
such protection. Accordingly, the courts must interpret Indian
First Amendment rights such that Indian religions are pre-
served.
The trust doctrine is, admittedly, one of the most reinvented
and reconstructed concepts in federal Indian law.' The source
of its creation,1 73 to whom it extends, and what it entails are
debated issues. The source of this debate lies in the shifting
history of federal-Indian relations. The European powers, fol-
lowed by the United States, recognized the Indian nations as
independent sovereigns, conducting their relations through the
treaty process. As Indian power diminished and American objec-
tives towards Indian lands, resources and existence transformed
over time, federal policies changed. The government embarked
on a process of "domesticating" Indians both legally and sociolog-
ically into the American mainstream. The judiciary has support-
ed these changes in federal policies through creative legal find-
170. 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
171. Id. at 1213, 1216, 1220.
172. Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 422 (1984); Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Fed-
eral Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979
(1981); Reid P. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225-26 (1983) (stating
that the trust doctrine is implicit in certain statutes and arises from a general trust
relationship between the United States and Indian people); United States v. Sioux
Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 415 (1980); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286,
296-97 (1942); Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1923). Treaties also
serve as a source of the trust relationship.
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ings and new interpretations and tests.7 4 The trust doctrine or
relationship has prevailed despite changing federal policies and
definitions of Indian status.'75
Today the trust relationship can be described as an implicit
compact between the United States government and the aborigi-
nal peoples of the United States. It is a relationship derived and
emanating from the natives' cession of lands to the United
States. In return for land, the United States has obligated itself
to protect native existence.7 6 Given that existence is self-defin-
ing, the trust relationship requires a cooperative and equitable
relationship between the two parties.
The existence of the trust doctrine is well documented
through treaties,"' legal opinions,"' and congressionallegislation.179 Chief Justice John Marshall first referred judi-
174. The Court's distinction between recognized and aboriginal title in Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 2721 (1955), and United States v. Santa Fe
Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941) is one example. See Joseph W. Singer, Well Set-
tled?: The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L.
REV. 481 (1994) (discussing how the Court's definition of aboriginal rights deviates
from Justice John Marshall's description of Indian property rights). Given this histor-
ical context, the attempt to provide an overall and coherent framework for federal
Indian law, based on logical precedent, is an enterprise taxing to even the most cre-
ative legal minds.
175. Several authors have pointed to the trust doctrine's importance in assisting
tribes to protect their religious rights, but have understandably concluded that the
courts' use of the trust relationship is too misunderstood and misapplied. See Ward
supra note 113, at 809. But see Jeri Beth K. Ezra, Comment, The Trust Doctrine: A
Source of Protection for Native American Sacred Sites, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 705
(1989).
176. See WILLIAM C CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 34-37 (2d
ed. 1988); Chambers, supra note 172 at 1219; Clinton, supra note 172, at 984-86;
Sen. Daniel K Inouye, Discrimination and Native American Religious Rights, 23
U.W.L.A. L. REv. 3, 18 (1992).
As the Court made clear in Mitchell, there is an "undisputed existence of a
general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people." 463
U.S. at 225. This general trust relationship, however, does not automatically provide
Indian people with a cause of action for money damages for the breach of the trust.
See Gila River Pina-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 427 F.2d 1194,
1201 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (Davis, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe 'fair and honorable dealings' clause
was [not] a catch-all allowing monetary redress for the general harm-psychological,
social, cultural, economic-done the Indians by the historical national policy of semi-
apartheid."), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
177. The United States has negotiated more than 800 treaties with tribes. Of
these, 371 remain legally binding. For a listing of most treaties negotiated with Indi-
an Nations, see CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREATIES (1904).
178. See infra text accompanying notes 180-99.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 200-04. The existence of a trust duty
between the United States and an Indian or Indian tribe can be inferred from the
provisions of a statute or regulation, "reinforced by the undisputed existence of a
general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people." Mitch-
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cially to the relationship in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia"8 and
in Worcester v. Georgia.181 The Cherokees were a domestic de-
pendent nation"8 2 that exercised exclusive authority within its
territorial boundaries."8 According to Marshall, the relation-
ship between the Cherokees and the United States was that of a
ward to his guardian.'8 " The Cherokees were a protectorate of
the United States; a weaker state, which without giving up its
sovereignty, had accepted the protection of a more powerful
state. 1"
Over the years, the courts have continually reinterpreted the
trust relationship as that of guardian to a ward.' As guard-
ian, the United States possessed total rights and control to dic-
tate the content and parameters of the relationship. The Court's
reasoning was carried to its most extreme in the United States v.
Kagama"' and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock's  decisions. In
Kagama, the Court emphasized that tribes are the wards of the
government and stated that as a result of "their very weakness
and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it
the power."'89 In Lone Wolf, the Court found that the only limi-
tations on the government's authority were those "considerations
of justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment
of an ignorant and dependent race."9 °
By the mid-1930s, in United States v. Creek Nation,9 ' the
Court had begun to re-balance the trust relationship, acknowl-
ell, 463 U.S. at 225; see also Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, Nos. 69, 299
& 353, slip. op. at 5 (Ct. Cl. Sept. 19, 1978) ("The trust relationship does not depend
for its existence on the terms of treaties, agreements, and statutes.").
180. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
181. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
182. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
183. Id. at 17, 53, 74.
184. Id. at 17.
185. Id. at 17, 24.
186. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); United StAtes v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886).
187. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84.
188. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
189. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
190. 187 U.S. at 565 (quoting Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877)). In
Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157 (Ct. Cl. 1979), Judge
Nichols referred to the date of the Lone Wolf decision as "one of the blackest days in
the history of the American Indian, the Indians' Dred Scott decision." Id. at 1173
(Nichols, J., concurring).
191. 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
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edging that the United States possessed judiciable obligations in
its relationship with Indian tribes.'92 A series of cases followed
in which the Court ruled that the United States possessed a
fiduciary responsibility to protect tribal lands'93 and resourc-
es. 194
Subsequent decisions9 ' confirmed the United States' obli-
gation to protect Indian culture and existence, including
health 96 and education. In Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v.
Smith.1 the court stated, "Congress has the power ... to pre-
serve our Native American Indians... as a cohesive culture
until such time, if ever, all of them are assimilated in the main
stream of American culture."' 9 The court held that the federal
exemption "allowing tribal Native Americans to continue their
centuries-old tradition of peyote use is rationally related to the
legitimate governmental objective of preserving Native American
culture." '
192. Id. at 108-09. In Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, the Court held that the
government's disposition of tribal lands under the public land laws would be an act
of confiscation, not guardianship. 249 U.S. 110 (1919)
193. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Menominee
Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); see Jeri Beth K. Ezra, Comment, The
Trust Doctrine: A Source of Protection for Native American Sacred Sites, 38 CATH. U.
L. REV. 705 (1989) (discussing the trust doctrine's application to sacred sites as a
function of the government's obligation to protect Indian property rights).
194. In Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942), the Court
extended the government's responsibility to include tribal funds held in trust. See
Ezra, supra note 193, at 719-20.
195. See FRANCIS P. PRuCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 399 (1984).
196. See, e.g., White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (1978) ("We think that Con-
gress has unambiguously declared that the federal government has a legal responsi-
bility to provide health care to Indians."). In Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. 2024, 2033
(1993), the Court refused to determine whether the Secretary's decision to cancel a
program for handicapped children violated the trust relationship, but stated: "What-
ever the contours of that relationship, though, it could not limit the Service's discre-
tion to reorder its priorities from serving a subgroup of beneficiaries to serving the
broader class of all Indians nationwide."
197. 556 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
198. Id. at 639.
199. 922 F.2d 1210, 1216 (1991). In at least two cases, the courts have found
that the states may legitimately exercise a trust relationship towards Indians. See,
e.g., Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding a Sante Fe, New
Mexico ordinance which allowed Indian artisans exclusive commercial areas against
equal protection claims by finding that states may exercise the federal trust power
for the benefit of American Indians), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); St. Paul In-
tertribal Hous. Bd. v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408, 1412 (D. Minn. 1983) ("State
action for the benefit of Indians can also fall under the trust doctrine and therefore
be protected from challenge under the equal protection clause or civil rights stat-
utes.").
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In several recent bills, Congress has acknowledged the spe-
cial political relationship that it maintains with tribes and has
accepted its responsibility to ensure the continued future of Indi-
an people. In the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act2" Congress
stated:
Recognizing the special relationship between the United States
and the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal re-
sponsibility to Indian people ... Congress, through statutes,
treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes,
has assumed the responsibility for the protection and preserva-
tion of Indian tribes and their resources .... 201
The 1976 Indian Health Care Improvement Act affirms that
"Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation, in
fulfillment of its special responsibilities and legal obligations to
the American Indian people, to meet the national goal of provid-
ing the highest possible health status to Indians."2 °2 The re-
cently passed Indian Tribal Justice Act states that "the United
States has a trust responsibility to each tribal government that
includes the protection of the sovereignty of each tribal govern-
ment.- o
The proposed Native American Cultural Protection and Free
Exercise of Religion Act of 1994 emphasizes:
[T]he United States has a unique, government-to-government
relationship... which permits the United States to take mea-
sures to protect against interference with the continuing cultur-
al cohesiveness and integrity of Indian tribes and Native Amer-
ican traditional cultures ... as part of the historic Federal-
Indian trust relationship it is the intent of the United States to
pursue enforceable Federal policies which will protect the Na-
tive American community and tribal vitality and cultural integ-
rity .... 04
200. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
201. Sub-section (3) continues: "[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and . . . the
United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children ..
25 U.S.C. § 1901(3)(1988) (emphasis added).
202. Pub. L. No. 94-437, § 3, 90 Stat. 1400, 1401 (1976) (codified in scattered
sections of 25 U.S.C.); see White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 555 (D. S.D 1977),
affd per curiam, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978) ("We think that Congress has unam-
biguously declared that the federal government has a legal responsibility to provide
health care to Indians. This stems from the 'umique relationship' between Indians
and the federal government, a relationship that is reflected in hundreds of
cases . . ").
203. 25 U.S.C. § 3601(2) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
204. S. 2269, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(4)(5) (1994); see also The Indian Self-
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Recent presidential addresses provide further proof of the
government's responsibility to protect Indian existence. In a
meeting with Indian leaders in 1991, President Bush stated,
"[t]oday we move forward toward a permanent relationship of
understanding and trust, a relationship in which the tribes of
the nation sit in positions of dependent sovereignty along with
other governments that compose the family that is America.""5
In April 1994, President Bill Clinton held a historic meeting
with tribal leaders at the White House. In his address he not
only reaffirmed the importance of the government's obligation,
but specifically spoke of the government's responsibility to pre-
serve Indian existence and religion:
Today I reaffirm our commitment to self-determination for
tribal governments. I pledge to fulfill the trust obligations of
the Federal Government. I vow to honor and respect tribal
sovereignty based upon our unique historic relationship. And I
pledge to continue my efforts to protect your right to fully exer-
cise your faith as you wish... your culture and your very exis-
tence.2°
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia based his rejection of the strict scruti-
ny/compelling state interest test in Smith on the Court's prior
refusal to grant exemption unless the free exercise claim was
supported by another constitutional claim, such as the right to
free speech in the Sherbert2 °7 decision and the right to educate
one's children in Yoder.2' However, the Court has at its dispos-
al the trust doctrine, which not only meets this hybrid re-
quirement, but by the Court's own analysis, must be used to
Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1988).
205. 27 PuB. PAPERS 783, 785 (June 14, 1991).
206. President William Clinton further emphasized:
This then is our first principle: respecting your values, your religions, your identity,
and your sovereignty. This brings us to the second principle that should guide our
relationship: We must dramatically improve the Federal Government's relationships
with the tribes and become full partners with the tribal nations .... The judgement
of history will be that the President of the United States and the leaders of the
sovereign Indian nations met and kept faith with each other and our common heri-
tage and together lifted our great nations to a new and better place.
Remarks to American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Leaders, in 30 PUB. PAPERS
941, 942, 944 (April 29, 1994).
207. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
208. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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protect tribal rights.2" As the Court has recognized,21° the
United States government is not mandated by the United States
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to hold Indians to the same standards of constitu-
tional protection as other groups. The Court's decisions in
Talton, Mancari, Martinez, and a number of other cases have
conclusively proven this.2" The tribes' status as inherent sover-
eigns predating the existence of the United States Constitution
precludes any other analysis.2 2
The courts then may apply a separate standard to tribes.
The trust doctrine, as discussed, obligates the United States
government to take those measures, which, as trustee, will en-
sure continued tribal existence. Congress, the President, and the
courts have recognized that religion is an immutable aspect of
Indian culture, life, and existence.21 As the receiver of more
than ninety-seven percent of the continental United States, the
government has obligated itself, as trustee, to be held to high
fiduciary standards. 4
209. See Fort, supra note 135, at 205-08 (offering an analysis whereby the Court
can protect the rights of minorities through the First Amendment).
210. From a political philosophical perspective, one can also argue that Indian
people are not part of the consent of the governed.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 153-69.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 153-69.
213. See Michaelsen, supra note 16 at 47.
214. Over the years the Court has developed canons of construction to be applied
in deciding Indian rights cases. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca City, 426 U.S. 373 (1976);
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (requiring clear and
specific statement by Congress before divestment of Indian authority); DeCoteau v.
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
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